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INTEGRATING POLICY: IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
INTRODUCTION 
In May 1995, the International Development Research 
Centre convened a workshop in Ottawa on the topic "INTESEP: 
a Matter of Learning." Practitioners active in multiparty 
negotiation of integrated social, economic and 
environmental policies (INTESEP) from Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and Canada examined their own experiences and 
considered how a learning paradigm could be used to make 
the process of negotiating integrated policies more 
effective. The results of that workshop are reported 
elsewhere i 
This paper grows out of the INTESEP learning workshop, 
and investigates how research on the complex process of 
policy implementation can be applied to the building of 
organizations which will be charged with the task of 
negotiating and sustaining integrated policies. This paper 
reviews research on policy implementation and institutional 
change, and draws on the experiences of specific 
integrative activities to explore some of the concepts 
suggested by the implementation literature. 
POLICY COMMUNITIES 
Theorists working on implementation research are 
slowly coming to a conclusion reached long ago by field 
practitioners - that the state is not, in practice, a 
unitary actor in either the negotiation or the 
implementation of complex, overlapping or integrated 
policies. 
"Even though they may provide a useful framework at 
the international level, concepts such as state 
willingness, national concern, or governmental 
capacity have limited, and only the most general, 
utility at the domestic and especially the local 
level by which time the state has already 
disintegrated into myriad organizations, agencies 
' See Greg Armstrong, Integrating Policy: A Matter of Learning, 
IDRC Manuscript Report, Ottawa: International Development Research 
Centre, 1995. 
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and actors pursuing different, often conflicting, 
interests and strategies.' 
It is clear that processes of policy formation and 
negotiation involve communities or systems of actors both 
within and outside-of the formal structures of government. 
These policy communities iteratively and interactively 
formulate and reformulate policy as they consider how 
disparate interests of state and private organizations and 
groups will be affected by policy innovations. Policy 
communities have been described as networks of groups 
engaged in discussion or debate on a given policy issue, or 
on a constellation of related issues. The members of any 
policy community may engage each other in discussion, but 
the community itself can be comprised of policy coalitions 
with sharply contrasting viewpoints.3 
It has been suggested by some writers that democratic 
structures of government which give the general population 
a vote provide a legitimizing function for the negotiations 
of much smaller policy communities, but do not in fact 
ensure that the average citizen has a significant role in 
the formulation of policy. To be sure, the citizen in a 
democracy, through exercise of the franchise, can affect 
which elected officials will play a role in the communities 
which negotiate policy. But these elected officials, while 
occasionally playing the dominant role, usually do not, 
alone, determine what policies will be formulated or 
adopted. It is the "minorities that care" who organize 
themselves to fight for their own interests in the policy 
debate, and, in the most constructive of policy processes, 
to learn from each other.4 What practitioners negotiating 
integrated policies and programmes agree,' is that this 
2 Adil Naj am, Learning from the Literature on Policy 
Implementation: A Synthesis Perspective. Working Paper. Luxembourg: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. July 1995. 
3 See Evert A. Lindquist, Public managers and policy communities: 
learning to meet new challenges. Canadian Public Administration, vol. 
35, #2. p 127-159; and Kai N. Lee, Compass and Gyroscope: Integrating 
Science and Politics for the Environment. Queenston, Ontario: Marvyn 
Melnyk Associates. 1993. 
4 Lee, p. 97. 
5 Armstrong, 1995. 
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type of constructive learning is essential (but not 
inevitable) in building sustainable integration. 
It is important to distinguish the "client groups" 
targeted for a policy purpose from the coalitions of 
interest groups, people who may or may not be targeted, but 
who have an interest in what and how policy is formulated. 
While the policy coalitions may affect how policy is 
formulated, the client groups will determine how it is 
received. 
It is these actors who, to a large extent, make policy 
systems or policy communities intrinsically unpredictable. 
Policy systems constitute: 
...an amorphous region inhabited by people 
united by common interest in an issue without 
boundaries. The issues are often sticky, 
complicated, tangled and conflicted affairs. 
They reflect the coalescing of many ongoing 
social, technical and political dilemmas that 
cut across organizations, nations and 
communities.' 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The earliest classical, primarily prescriptive, 
studies of bureaucratic behaviour by Max Weber and others 
suggested there should be a separation between policy and 
implementation. They also suggested that in the rationally 
structured organization, with established mechanisms for 
accountability and monitoring, and with the right training, 
faithful implementation of policy was both desirable and 
achievable. 
Empirical research on implementation as it occurs in 
the field, however, presents another view. Recent studies 
reiterate what the earliest case-studies of real-life 
6 Marvin Weisbord [Ed], Discovering Common Ground, San Francisco, 
Berrett-Koehler, 1992, p 157. 
See United States Agency for International Development, 
Implementing Policy Change: Lessons Learned. Washington: USAID, 1992; 
and Najam, 1995. 
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implementation suggested a quarter of a century ago: that 
both policy makers and implementers tend to underestimate 
the complexity and uncertainty of the implementation 
process. One consequence of this is that policy makers 
often attempt to control a process which is both unlikely 
to be effectively controlled, and which quite probably 
should not be. It is difficult enough negotiating the 
formulation of integrated policies. Implementing them, and 
sustaining the integration during prolonged implementation, 
is inevitably even more complex. 
The predictable variables affecting implementation -- 
the content of the policy, the institutional and the 
organizational contexts within which it is implemented, the 
commitment (or lack of it) by the people charged with 
implementation, the organizational and human capacity to 
effectively or faithfully implement [these two are not 
necessarily the same thing] and the clients or coalitions 
who are affected -- are themselves immensely complicated. 
But there are also the "unanticipated participants" whose 
appearance on the scene can drastically affect the 
implementation process. 
This unpredictability has been documented in hundreds 
of studies of the implementation of innovation and of 
policy conducted over the past twenty-five years.9 It is 
a useful heuristic approach to treat policy, particularly 
policy designed to foster integration of environmental, 
social and economic interests, as a political innovation. 
It is clear, with the sector-specific organization of most 
government ministries, and of the policies which they 
formulate, that integrating these concepts is at least 
perceived to be an innovation by most people engaged in 
both fostering the concept of integration, and affected by 
it. 
Just as important as the documented complexity of 
implementation, is the clear and consistent finding from 
e See Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, for one of the earliest 
detailed and systematic descriptions of implementation processes. 
9 This review draws upon two primary streams of implementation 
research: that concerned with the implementation of innovations in 
educational institutions, and that concerned with policy. A careful 
review of both streams of research indicates many points of 
convergence. 
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field research that policies are effectively reformulated 
during the implementation process, that innovations are, in 
the process of application, redesigned. Research on the 
formulation, diffusion, adoption and the subsequent 
implementation of innovations shows that the adoption of an 
innovation, including the adoption of policy, is not the 
end of a process. Adoption is just one stage in a 
continuous cycle of innovation, adaptation, implementation, 
reformulation and reinvention. 
One of the principal researchers in this field has 
described the implementation process has having three 
stages: mobilization of support for the innovation, 
implementation, and institutionalization.10 Implementation 
research indicates clearly that it is very unlikely that 
any innovation or policy will be implemented as a complete 
and faithful replication of the announced policy, given the 
variables involved. The chances of institutionalizing, 
regularizing and sustaining the implementation of a policy 
innovation over a long period of time will necessarily be 
even more subject to variability. Each stage will be 
complex, and at each stage some variation will be 
introduced and incorporated in the policy if it is to be 
sustained. 
For a minority of implementation theorists, this is 
essentially a threat to democracy. 
If one accepts fully the descriptive 
generalization about implementation being 
determined largely by the lower echelons in 
organizations also as a prescriptive statement 
... then many ideas about policy control in 
democratic political systems must be questioned 
....The fundamental point remains: governance 
is not about negotiation, it is about the use 
of legitimate authority ....[To] place goal 
definition in the hands of that element of the 
public sector... is to admit defeat and the 
inability of the policy making hierarchies in 
10 See Paul Berman, The Study of Macro and Micro Implementation, 
Public Policy, Vol 26, 2, 1978, p. 157-84. 
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government to function effectively to produce 
governance." 
All of this is predicated upon the assumption that 
policy itself is formulated democratically. But other 
researchers maintain that most policy communities, the 
groups which form policy, are not large enough to encompass 
broad public participation, in any case: 
Learning occurs, ideas matter, citizens and 
democracy in a direct sense do not. That the 
society is democratic in its political culture 
is important, however, because democratic 
idealism maintains the opennessof the policy 
subsystems both to newcomers and to occasional 
scrutiny. 12 
Variation of policy during implementation is seen, in 
fact, by most researchers as a rational response to an 
essentially unpredictable operating environment. Even 
technical innovations, introduced into apparently 
controlled and limited organizational contexts such as 
schools, come up against the immense variability of human 
behaviour. Social and economic behaviour, and the 
functioning of the physical environment may have patterns, 
but as chaos theory suggests, these are only occasionally 
visible to even the most careful observers, and such 
systems are therefore, for practical short- and medium-term 
purposes of policy and implementation, essentially 
unpredictable. 
Where social, economic and environmental issues 
overlap, as they do in real life every day, and 
occasionally also in policy discussions, the complexity of 
response, and the inherent unpredictability of outcomes, 
are reinforced. "Complexity, dynamism and unpredictability 
..are not merely things that get in the way," as Michael 
Fullan observes. "They are normal. 03 This "dynamic 
11 Linder and Peters, cited in Najam, 1995, p. 13. 
12 
Lee, p. 100-101. 
13 Michael Fullan, Change Forces. London: The Fulmer Press, 
1993, p. 20. 
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complexity", where "cause and effect are subtle ,14 is a 
factor which policy makers cannot ignore, because, 
essentially, they do not know what they do not know, as 
even the occasional economist will admit: 
In a world of uncertainty, no one knows the 
correct answer to the problems we confront 
....The society that permits the maximum 
generation of trials will be most likely to 
solve problems through time.... Adaptive 
efficiency, therefore, provides the incentives 
to encourage the development of decentralized 
decision-making processes that will allow 
societies to maximize the efforts required to 
explore alternate ways of solving problems.15 
The rational response to unpredictability, which is 
manifest most clearly at the local level of operation where 
variability of behaviour takes on human shape, is to adapt 
an innovation (whether it is a technology, a new behaviour 
or a policy) to the reality of the field. This is not a 
prescriptive statement. It is a description of what 
happens every day as policies are put into practice, and 
why it happens. 
New ideas of any worth, to be effective require 
an in-depth understanding and the development 
of skill and commitment to make them work. You 
cannot mandate these things .... The more that 
mandates are used the more that fads-prevail, 
the more that change is seen as superficial and 
marginal.... Mandates alter some things, but 
they don't affect what matters. When complex 
change is involved, people do not and cannot 
change by being told to so.16 
The motivation for adoption of a policy or innovation 
by those charged with implementing it is critical to the 
chances of policy sustainability. Research shows that an 
"opportunistic" adoption motivation, one which is compelled 
14 
P. Senge, The Fifth Discipline, New York: Doubleday, 1990. 
15 Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Chance and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 81. 
16 Fullan, p. 23-24. 
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by authoritative decree, or induced by the promise of 
material reward alone, will not lead to sustainable 
implementation. Conversely, a "problem-solving" adoption 
motivation, derived from a genuine appreciation of the 
necessity for change, is more likely to lead to a 
sustained, even if altered, implementation of the policy.17 
The study of implementation requires 
understanding that apparently simple sequences 
of events depend on a complex chain of 
reciprocal interactions. Hence, each part of 
the chain must be built with the others in 
view. The separation of policy design from 
:implementation is fatal.18 
If this is true of simple policies or innovations, how 
much more complicated the process must be for policies 
which are obviously complex, such as the attempt to 
integrate social, economic and environmental policy. 
Integration is so obviously complicated that the complexity 
itself may be an advantage in linking policy to 
implementation; no policy maker would be easily inclined to 
take the implementation of such an obviously complex policy 
for granted. This may be a rather tenuous hope, however, 
and it may be more often true that policy makers faced with 
the complexity of integration will either oversimplify the 
process, dealing only at the level of rhetoric, or 
recognizing the complexity, give up on the process. 
What the broad spectrum of implementation research 
tells us is that the best chance for the sustained 
implementation of a policy innovation is "mutual 
adaptation" between the policy or innovation on the one 
hand, and the established behaviour of those charged with 
field-level implementation, on the other. Without 
adaptation, the innovation is most likely to be either 
coopted, superficially adopted but buried in established 
practice, or just ignored. Even worse, where faithful 
implementation or replication of a policy innovation is 
attempted in the face of local cultural, economic or 
environmental conditions which would suggest adaptation or 
reformulation, the policy may be rejected completely, and 
17 See Paul Berman and Milbrey McLaughlin, Implementation of 
Educational Innovations, in Educational Forum, March 1976. 
18 Pressman and Wildavsky, p. xvii. 
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end up dysfunctionally promoting behaviour inimical to the 
original intentions. 
Research suggests that to have the best chance of 
mutually adaptive implementation, one which meets some or 
most of the objectives of the policy makers, while at the 
same time facing the reality of the field, uncertain or 
non-technical innovations (such as the introduction of new 
population control practices, for example) must be 
compatible with dominant local cultural traditions; must 
support, or at least not interfere with local culturally- 
adapted forms of implementation; and must not play into 
local ethnic conflicts.19 
Two schools of implementation research, those studying 
implementation from a macro point of view from the top 
down, as policy is followed through the implementation 
process, and those studying implementation from the bottom 
up, as case studies of field level operations reveal the 
policy in practice as it is perceived by those implementing 
it, are now converging on at least one point: policy must 
be seen as a "moving target" which changes with context.20 
PLANNING FOR UNPREDICTABILITY 
Planning centralizes thinking and policy development. 
On the other hand, 11 [an] adaptive search for sustainability 
learns from implementation, and implementation 
decentralizes power .... The tension between planning and 
implementation needs to be managed in the pursuit of 
sustainable development because implementation supplies the 
signals of what does not work, what needs to be modified in 
a centrally developed plan. ,21 Or, as Fullan says: 
"Another reason that you can't mandate what matters, is 
that you don't know what is going to matter until you are 
19 Donald P. Warwick, Bitter Pills: Population Policies and their 
Implementation in Eight Developing Countries Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1982, p. 186. 
20 Najam, 1995; also Tom Peters, Liberation Management, New York: 
A. Knopf, 1992; and Henry Mintzberg, Mintzbera on Management, New York: The Free Press, 1989. 
21 Lee, p. 112. 
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into the journey.1122 Programme environments are, as Warwick 
says, multiple, shifting, and difficult to predict in 
detail before implementation takes place.23 This is a view 
shared by almost all implementation researchers, whether 
they focus on public sector implementation or private, 
whether the focus is academic, or popular.24 Mintzberg, in 
developing management theory, concurs. It is, he says, 
necessary to "cherish anomalies".25 The vast preponderance 
of implementation research makes it clear that it is the 
implementers in the field who tell policy makers what the 
anomalies are. 
Policy, as Pressman and Wildavsky26 pointed out in one 
of the earliest detailed studies of implementation, is 
essentially an hypothesis which is tested during 
implementation against the realities of everyday life, in 
the implementing institution, on the street and in the 
field. For those with a serious interest in how policy 
affects life, there is no point in abandoning the process 
after the theory has been formulated, but before it has 
been tested. Legislation is just the first step in the 
process of bargaining between the competing policy 
coalitions in a policy community. Implementation is an 
interactive process which refines the bargain, adapting it 
to local situations. Policy is significant, "not because it 
sets the exact course of implementation, but because it 
shapes the potential for action."' 
The response to the view that policy is essentially a 
theory remaining to be tested, as Lee suggests twenty years 
after the Pressman and Wildavsky study, is to treat 
22 Fullan, ? 
23 Warwick, p. 182. 
24 See Peter Drucker, Henry Mintzberg and Tom Peters latest works, 
for confirmation. 
25 Mintzberg, p. 253. 
26 Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973, xv-xvi. 
27 Downey and Hanf cited in Najam, 1995, p. 22 
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implementation as an experiment; to try out different 
approaches in different locales, to learn what works. 28 
The important conclusion from all of this research is 
that policy and implementation are part of the same 
process; that policy formulation cannot, or at least should 
not, be segregated from implementation; and that policy 
will inevitably be reformulated, whether the policy makers 
like it or not, during the implementation process. The 
people who deliver, interpret and act upon policy 
inevitably change it as they put it into action and as it 
affects client groups. If all of this can be accepted, if 
surprise can be seen as unexceptional, it has, as Lee says, 
an important consequence, because "surprising results [will 
be seen as] legitimate, rather than signs of failure, in an 
experimental framework. ,29 
This significant focus on policy and implementation as 
an iterative learning process, rather than a process of 
compliance, is one with which North agrees: 
We must also learn from failures, so that 
change will consist of the generation of 
organizational trials and the elimination of 
organization errors. There is nothing simple 
about this process, because organizational 
errors may be not only probabilistic, but also 
systematic, due to ideologies that may give 
people preferences for the kinds of solutions 
that are not oriented to adaptive efficiency. 30 
If many people dismiss the "policy sciences" for their 
failure to explain the complexities of society, the 
conclusion that some draw is that policy analysts should be 
concentrating not on devising detailed policy 
prescriptions, but on devising rules for the negotiation of 
complexities at the implementation level.31 
28 Lee, p. 9, 101-102. 
29 Lee, p. 65. 
30 North, 1990 p. 81. 
31 Richard D French, Postmodern Government: The John L. Manion 
Lecture, 1992. In Optimum, The Journal of Public Sector Management, vol 
23, #1. 1992. p. 43-51. 
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Imposed vision, derived from strategic planning yields 
compliance, but not commitment. To be effective, 
organizational vision must be generated internally, not imposed. There is a big difference, as Senge points out, 
between a genuine shared vision, and glib "vision 
statements" .3 If "ownership" of an innovation or policy is 
as important to committed implementation as research 
indicates, then it is important also to realize what 
learning theory tells us: that this ownership grows out of 
experience, experimentation, and problem-solving. That is 
why "mutual adaptation" is important to sustained 
implementation -- because it is an indicator that 
implementers are taking ownership of a policy.33 
STAKEHOLDERS, CONFLICT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Stakeholder involvement 
There is no shortage of anecdotal evidence to 
demonstrate how policies rigidly controlled during the 
implementation process and perceived to be successes by 
those who formulate them are often perceived as failures by 
those at the implementation end of the policy chain, 
whether these people are field-level implementation agents 
or programme clients. Yet there are also examples of 
policies so changed in implementation that they bear no 
resemblance to the original objectives, and which are 
perceived to be a success by clients and field operatives 
precisely because adaptation revealed new needs and new 
meaning to the policy. 
Because policies are full of symbolic intent, they are 
subject to multiple interpretations, including the 
interpretation of the client groups or stakeholders 
affected by implementation. If local conditions within 
which policies are implemented are often full of 
32 Senge, p. 9, 205-232. 
33 
See Fullan, and Mintzberg, for more detailed discussion. 
34 See Dvora Yanow, The Communication of policy meanings: 
Implementation as Interpretation, Policy Sciences, vol 26. 1993. P_ 41-61. 
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unpredictable variables, and if moving the policy process 
close to the field is one way of determining what works, 
then stakeholders, as well as local implementing agents, 
should be involved in the discussion of policy 
alternatives, means of implementation, and evaluation of 
process and results. 
This is even more important when the subject of the 
policy innovation is integration of social, economic and 
environmental operations. The average citizen needs no 
convincing of the integrated nature of these issues because 
he or she lives with the indivisibility of these factors on 
a day-to-day basis. Bureaucracies are not organized along 
integrative lines, however, and will require feedback from 
the general population to determine what works. "Every 
person is a change agent" because change is too complex for 
any individual to comprehend." 
The dynamic complexity of the world requires constant 
feedback to policy makers from the people closest to the 
field, and in fact their involvement in the policy review 
process. Stakeholders and clients as well as implementers 
should, therefore, be directly involved in the policy 
process, because they are the people closest to the reality 
of implementation. As Warwick observes in his study of the 
implementation of population policy in eight countries: 
...clients have a potent influence on the 
outcomes of implementation. Far from being 
receptacles into which services are 
dropped... they, like the implementers, have 
substantial discretion. They can reject a 
service entirely, accept it but not use it, 
accept it and use only those parts that suit 
their interest, strike deals with implementers, 
organize others to accept the service or 
mobilize opposition against the service or the 
entire program.36 
35 Fullan, p. 39. 
36 Warwick, p. 183. 
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The implication of all of this is that both policy 
formation and implementation processes, to effectively take 
advantage of the situation-specific knowledge of clients 
and implementers, should actively incorporate both of these 
groups in policy formation, and into policy implementation 
reviews. 
It is important to identify not only the 
clients recognized by the...policy but also 
those not recognized. Very often, it is the 
[latter] who, by virtue of not being recognized 
or catered for, have the greatest incentive to 
disrupt implementation; moreover, they can 
often do so with success since implementers are 
not expecting resistance from them.37 
When line staff suggest changes to policy, their 
suggestions should receive serious attention. Their 
interest alone may be an indication both of the beginnings 
of a problem-solving adoption motivation for the 
implementers and also that the process of mutual adaptation 
which is necessary for sustained implementation, is at 
work. To feel the sense of "ownership" of a policy which 
is necessary for committed implementation, a process of 
"reinventing the wheel", no matter how apparently redundant 
it may appear to impatient policy makers, is necessary .38 
Functions of conflict 
if the self-correcting feedback loop between 
implementation and policy is to work, conflict is more or 
less inevitable. In the formation of environmental policy, 
and in attempts to integrate social, economic and 
environmental concerns in policy, conflict is often the 
most visible dimension of the policy process. Practitioners 
of integrated policy development from diverse political, 
cultural and economic contexts have agreed that, properly 
37 Najam, p. 52. 
38 See Denis De Pape, Case Study of Environmental Integration at 
Manitoba Hydro: Process, Contributing Factors and Information Used, 
Paper prepared for the International Development Research Centre, June 
1995, p. 23, for a practical example. Implementation research abounds 
with other examples. 
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managed, conflict can be a productive force in the learning 
which is essential to agreement between groups during the 
negotiation of integrated policy, despite apparently 
opposed interests. 
Conflict is not an uncomfortable coincidence of 
these changes.... it is central .... You should be 
thinking of conflict, planning for it, because 
it is fundamentally important to these changes, 
and if it is not there we would not be dealing 
with integrated policy and fundamental change. 
Trying to think of conflict proactively or in a 
positive sense as something we are trying to 
find, accommodate, deal with and manage 
constructively... is really crucial to the idea 
of integrated policy." 
Implementation theorists agree: 
Because conflict (properly managed) is 
essential for productive change ...the group 
that perceives conflict as an opportunity to 
learn something, instead of something to be 
avoided, or as an occasion to entrench one's 
position, is the group that will prosper. You 
can't have organizational learning without 
individual learning and you can't have learning 
in groups without processing conflict.40 
Conflict which breaks down into violence will not be 
productive. "Bounded conflict" in the social sphere, what 
is essentially politics, is a fact of life in every 
organization. The process of learning from conflict is one 
which may require the transformation of institutions which 
once were productive, but have become with time obstructive 
to common goals.41 Some of these institutions may be a 
society's existing political practices. Certainly the 
increasing move to multiparty negotiation of integrated 
39 practitioner quoted in Armstrong, 1995, p. 16. 
40 Fullan, p. 36. 
41 Daniel P. Keating, The Learning Society in the Information Age, 
draft article, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1995, p. 26. 
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policy development around the world is a sign that learning 
is under way. "The task of these negotiations, 
...is to work out 'rules of the road', ways to 
continue disputes within a process that all 
parties regard as workable. The negotiations 
are not aimed at ending conflict or politics, 
but at restructuring it .... 42 
Whether that learning will be productive depends on how the 
negotiation processes are implemented. 
Institutional change 
Any consideration of how negotiation of differences 
can change implementation of policy must deal with how 
institutions function. Institutions, as Douglas North 
defines them, include "any form of constraint that human 
beings devise to shape human interaction.11 These 
constraints may be formal or informal; may take the form of 
custom and belief or written rules; or may be manifested in 
specific organizational arrangements. They both prohibit 
and permit behaviour and "they therefore are the framework 
within which human interaction takes place." The important 
point of all of this, of course, is that institutions are 
not organizations, although organizations, which are 
essentially a "social technology",43 may be the most 
visible manifestation of an institution." Institutions are 
a consequence of learning.45 
Organizations are created with purposive intent 
in consequence of the opportunity set resulting 
from the existing set of constraints 
(institutional ones as well as the traditional 
ones of economic theory) and in the course of 
42 Lee, p. 2. 
43 peter F. Drucker, The Age of Social Transformation. The 
Atlantic Monthly. November 1994 p. 72. 
44 North, 1990, p. 4. 
45 Douglas North, Economic Performance through Time, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 84, #3, 1994, p. 360. 
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attempts to accomplish their objectives are a 
major agent of institutional change.46 
As organizations regularize their activities and the 
behaviour of the people working in them, "actions become 
informed with value"', organizational myths are created, 
precedents form meaning, and organizations may evolve from 
being an instrument for the achievement of specific tasks 
to becoming institutions themselves. 
Institutions are the rules we establish as a society, 
to manage and diminish uncertainty. The argument that many 
implementation theorists,-management-gurus and economists 
are making now is that the institutions and their 
organizational manifestations which are the most functional 
in dealing with complex and variable policy environments, 
are those which foster maximum interaction between people 
with different points of view; which promote learning from 
these interactions; and which support experimentation with 
policy variation in response to diversity. 
What is important here is that if we view 
implementation not simply as the mechanical followthrough 
from policy, but as the negotiation of interests and the 
accommodation of multiple points of view, then we also 
change social, economic and political institutions as we 
negotiate and as we implement policy. The interactions 
between implementers and their physical, social and 
political environments change the rules by which people 
operate, even if these changes take place incrementally. 
The popular perception of Western democratic political 
institutions, and for that matter virtually all political 
institutions whether parliamentary or not, whether 
democratic or authoritarian, is that policy is established 
by those with visible political power, and subsequently 
transmitted and implemented by field agents. This is also 
one view of other institutions, such as hierarchically 
structured religions. The fact, however, is that our 
institutions -- political, religious or economic -- in 
practice permit, through organizational arrangements, the 
renegotiation of policy during implementation. That may be 
why these institutions have lasted as long as they have. 
46 North, 1990, p. 5. 
47 Mintzber 225 5, p. 
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Revolutions are a visible indicator that institutions 
are changing. Revolutionary leaders often attempt to 
establish new institutions through the creation of 
organizations to regularize valued revolutionary 
behaviours. 
But incremental organizational change is the more 
common path to institutional change. Organizations do not 
change easily, and there may be good reason why they do 
not. "The reluctance to tamper with... standards, practices 
and procedures", De Pape says, reflecting on the behaviour 
of people in a large public utility, "should not be 
construed as narrow-mindedness but rather as a preference for maintaining a successful formula. , 48 In particular, 
the size and complexity of many organizations implicated in 
environmental change resulting in social and economic 
impacts, suggests that change is unlikely to occur quickly. 
The standards, practices and procedures which have 
evolved over time serve implementers' needs, perhaps also 
those of clients and policy makers. If these practices are 
to change it will have to be, in part, because the 
innovations being proposed are seen to serve clients and 
implementers (as well as policy-makers) better than did the 
old behaviours. It is when (or if) the implementers and 
clients see this improvement that their motivation for 
adoption can become problem-solving, and sustained change 
will be more likely. But to reach this end, the innovation 
must be susceptible to adaptation at the local level. 
New organizational arrangements have been tested over 
the past decade in a number of political jurisdictions, as 
political leaders try to find new methods of coping with 
variable and problematic policy environments where 
economic, social and environmental interests conflict. 
These organizational innovations, such as the Commission on 
Resources and Environment in British Columbia, Canada, 
various Round Tables established throughout the world, and 
a number of community-based attempts at integration by 
nongovernment organizations, are experiments with 
multiparty negotiation of interests as a method of 
developing integrated policy. 
The new political institutions which are undertaking 
multiparty negotiation processes are apparently not 
48 De Pape, p. 6. 
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supplanting existing political structures, but rather 
appear to be growing up beside them. One characteristic of 
many of these new institutions is that they provide in many 
cases a forum where people form alliances and networks, to 
consolidate interests and to negotiate with others. It is 
through the negotiation of differences that individuals and 
organizations learn to accommodate diversity, and it is 
this accommodation of diversity which provides policy 
makers and implementers with the information and the 
variability necessary to support effective implementation 
in the field. 
The interesting question which this raises for cross- 
cultural transferability of these institutions is whether 
an institution which uses conflict as a basis for learning 
can work in societies where avoidance of overt conflict is 
the norm. It is important in this connection, however, to 
distinguish between the search for consensus and the mere 
avoidance or denial of conflict. In some societies where 
conflict avoidance is the norm, there is not necessarily a 
search for consensus on anything except who has power. 
Examples abound of superficially consensus-based alignments 
falling into extreme violence when underlying disagreements 
come to the surface. The issue, then, is not whether 
institutions which learn from conflict can function in 
these societies, but in what cultural context, in what 
organizational form, against what backdrop of values and by 
which groups they must be reinvented, in order to function. 
The principles of mutual adaptation, of variability, of 
ownership and reinvention which apply to policy 
implementation, apply also to the intercultural transfer of 
institutions. 
CREATING INTEGRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 
While creating institutions which foster integration 
is a long-term task, we do know that creating organizations 
around compelling ideas is one achievable step in the 
process of institutionalization. Organizational change is 
easier than institutional change, but has its own 
complexity -- as the vast array of popular literature on 
management attests. What is useful, however, is to apply 
what is known about implementation to organizational 
learning and change. As Fullan, Mintzberg, Drucker, Peters 
and others have observed, the organization which learns to 
cope with diversity is not one which looks for clarity. It 
is flexible enough to deal with ambiguity, ready to 
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decentralize operational decision-making to the people for 
whom local events are not ambiguous, while at the same time 
able to maintain a central core function to sustain and 
monitor the development and adaptation of important 
organizational themes. The resolution of ambiguity takes 
place, therefore, at the operational level. 
Such organizations use strategic vision, or purpose, 
as a "screening device", as Fullan says, not as a rigid 
tool for control. Such organizations, Mintzberg concurs, 
allow new strategic visions to grow from the successes of 
local variation and experimentation. 
As organizations seek to change, to learn how to cope 
with the growing complexity of continuously changing 
situational challenges, they encounter the same 
facilitators and inhibitors of change which are encountered 
in all attempts to implement innovations. Change, to be 
sustained, must be the product of learning by all members 
of the organization, not simply those at the top, and it 
must be more than the articulation of a few easy buzz- 
words. There must be a clear congruence between the 
"espoused theory" of the leadership in support of 
innovation, and the "theory in practice".49 The process 
must, for the most part, be incremental; and the commitment 
of leadership to fostering diversity and learning within 
the organization will be tested over time: 
The fact is that there are no techniques for 
building ideologies, no five steps to a better 
culture. These are built slowly and patiently 
by committed leaders who have found interesting 
missions for their organizations and care 
deeply about the people who perform 
them.... workers, customers, everyone involved 
with management, no matter how physically 
distant, can tell when it is genuine in its 
beliefs and when it just mouthing the right 
words. 50 
49 Chris Argyris and D.A. Schon, Organizational Learning: A Theorv 
of Action Perspective, Don Mills: Addison Wesley. 1978. 
50 Mintzberg, p. 275. 
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The commitment of leaders alone to the ideal of 
creating a learning organization will be insufficient to 
make or sustain the change. Ownership of an innovation is 
essential, and ownership does not occur without experience, 
experiment, adaptation and learning. People throughout the 
organization must agree on the goal, work with the idea of 
creating a new organization, and learn to make it work for 
their own benefit, before the goal will become a 
sustainable fact. Leaders must accept that the rhetoric of 
flexibility must be accompanied by freedom for implementers 
to develop the operational systems which work for them. 
Creating an organization which can integrate social, 
economic -and_ environmental policy formation and 
implementation is, therefore, likely to be an immense, 
time-consuming and complex undertaking, both conceptually 
and practically. Before it can become even remotely 
possible, the motivation for attempting it must be 
compelling. 
As societies become more pluralistic, the political 
institutions which generate organizational structures such 
as legislatures, appear to be having progressively less 
success in integrating diverse viewpoints. As social 
mobilization raises both awareness of inequities and at the 
same time the potential for change through confrontation, 
a legislature can become a forum for airing regional or 
sectoral grievances and mobilizing self-serving partisan 
political support, rather than the locus of interest 
aggregation and integration. Drucker goes so far as to 
say: "There is thus in the society of organizations no one 
integrating force that pulls individual organization in 
society and community into coalitions.1151 It is clear, 
however, that most governments see themselves as playing, 
or potentially playing, this integrative role even if, as 
one practitioner of integrated policy development 
reflected, "until recent years such negotiations were rare 
and regarded by government as largely incidental to the 
decision-making process. ,*52 The question remains: what will 
51 Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Social Transformation, The 
Atlantic Monthly, November 1994. p. 80. 
52 Stephen Owen, Former Commissioner on Resources and Environment, 
British Columbia, commenting during an IDRC workshop on integration of 
policy, May 8-9, 1995. 
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motivate government, quite aside from myriad less powerful 
groups which need also to be motivated, to undertake the 
risky and substantial changes implied by integrative policy 
development? 
IDRC`s May 1995 workshop of practitioners of 
integrated policy making from Canada, Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America revealed general agreement that it is 
typically crises that force governments to recognize their 
inability to cope with complexity. Only when the risks of 
not finding new approaches to mounting problems are 
manifestly greater than the discomfort associated with 
giving up control will governments be motivated to 
experiment. What learning theory tells us is that for 
experimentation and learning to occur, learners must have 
a "margin" for risk-taking, some room to experiment and 
fail without threat to basic interests. It may be that the 
powerful, including political and economic elites, always 
have this margin for experimentation, but only recognize it 
when crisis forces them to see that failure to innovate may 
pose a serious threat to their position. Under these 
circumstances, the motivation to adopt policy innovations, 
including experiments with integrative institutions, will 
be a problem-solving one, and this is what is needed to 
begin and to sustain change." 
When there is a clear crisis, the status quo 
cannot be maintained, and there is a need to 
manage change, the incentive to take the risk 
may bring all parties to the negotiating table. 
This will only occur, however, if government 
makes it clear that that is where the action 
is, and that a failure to take part will give 
rise to the greater risk of not having an 
opportunity to influence the outcome .... In 
particular, the motivation for those with 
traditional political and economic power can 
only come from a clear message from government 
that the rules are changing and from a 
realization that they need the support of 
others to get what they want,sa 
53 See Armstrong, 1995, p. 17 - 21, for further discussion of 
"margin". 
54 Stephen Owen, commenting at the IDRC workshop on integrative 
policy development, May 8-9, 1995. 
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The Commission on Resources and Environment in British 
Columbia and the experience of the Pakistan National 
Conservation Strategy provide useful comparisons of how the 
creation of integrative processes can proceed. Two 
American researchers have called CORE "the most extensive 
use of shared decision-making by a governmental body to 
date. -111 Created by government mandate in 1992, with a 
small professional staff, it was told to resolve disputes 
and develop integrated land-use plans in a resource- 
dependent province. It has remained small over the three 
years it has been in existence, and it has proceeded in an 
incremental fashion, activity by activity, to negotiate 
agreements. The Pakistan National Conservation Strategy 
began with the assistance of the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature, and received considerable 
international as well as domestic support. 56 
Experience in British Columbia and in Pakistan 
indicates that government can respond to perceived crises 
by creating new organizations (and eventually perhaps new 
institutions) to promote integration. In British Columbia 
the crisis was brought home to government largely by public 
demonstrations. In Pakistan, perception of the crisis was 
led by academics, and brought home to government and other 
groups through search conferences. In both situations, 
government leadership and a strong organizational and 
resource commitment led to different, but integrative 
policy making activities which diverged substantially from 
prevailing practice.57 
55 Robert A. Kelly and Donald K. Alper, Transforming British 
Columbia's War in the Woods: An Assessment of the Vancouver Island 
Regional Negotiation Process of the Commission on Resources and 
Environment, Victoria: UVic Institute for Dispute Resolution 1995, p 1. 
56 See Roger Schwass, A Case Study of the Pakistan National 
Conservation Strategy, Paper prepared for the IDRC Roundtable Workshop 
on Policy Integration. Ottawa, May 8-9, 1995. 
57 See Stephen Owen, Managing for Sustainability: The Integration 
of Economic, Social and Environmental Policy - the Experienced of the 
British Columbia Commission on Resources and Environment, Paper 
presented at the IDRC Round Table Workshop on Policy Integration. 
Ottawa: May 8-9, 1995 and Roger. A Schwass, Case Study of the Pakistan 
National Conservation Strategy, Paper prepared for the IDRC Roundtable 
Workshop on Policy Integration, Ottawa, May 8-9, 1995. 
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In both cases new organizational units were formed to 
promote integration. In British Columbia it was a small 
organization specifically mandated to promote negotiated 
integrated policy development with a broad spectrum of 
interests, including government. In Pakistan, a series of 
ad hoc organizational groups from the Ministerial down to 
village level were formed to promote integration, but 
implementation strength appeared to come from a team formed 
outside of normal bureaucratic structures to work with the 
existing bureaucracy. 
In both British Columbia and Pakistan implementation 
depended on widespread involvement of stakeholders and of 
the policy community: labour unions, business, 
environmental activists and community groups. The lessons 
learned from studies of implementation of innovations 
suggest that this approach is necessary for success. 
...alliances are the bread and butter of 
learning organizations in dynamically complex 
societies. There are two reasons for this 
inevitable conclusion (and starting point for 
action). First, the problems are too difficult 
to solve by any one group; moreover, things 
that any agency does have consequences for all 
other relevant institutions so agencies affect 
each other in any case (usually negatively or 
arbitrarily). Second ...a variety of 
stakeholders insist on having a voice in what 
is happening. The choice is whether such 
involvement will occur as mutually isolated 
influences working randomly or at cross 
purposes or will be developed through joint 
initiatives.58 
The risk to government in initiating these new 
institutional approaches to governance is, of course, that 
it will lose control of the process. It is a risk which 
will be undertaken, therefore, only when government 
perceives that it may in any case be losing control of 
policy, and that a wider involvement of the public in 
decision-making will bring with it a spreading of the risk 
for failure. 
58 Fullan, p. 93. 
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Under conditions of uncertainty, learning, 
anxiety, difficulties and fear of the unknown 
are intrinsic to all change processes, 
especially the early stages. One can see why a 
risk-taking mentality and climate are so 
critical. People will not venture into 
uncertainty unless they or others appreciate 
that difficulties are a natural part of any 
change scenario. And if people do not venture 
into uncertainty, no significant change will 
occur. 59 
__ The "margin" for experimentation was provided in 
Pakistan, where resources were limited, by international 
donors. In British Columbia, by providing financial and 
organizational support to CORE, the government in effect 
provided the social margin for experimentation, and the 
Commission itself, by providing a forum for discussion and 
research and financial support to participants, gave them 
in turn the margin to risk participation in an unknown and 
untested process. 
Legitimation of the process for nongovernment actors 
will come only with the commitment of government to the 
process, and the expectation growing out of this commitment 
that consensus, if achieved, will be implemented. The 
evident risk which government takes in endorsing the 
process and providing resource supports to it may allow 
other stakeholders to take equally visible risks. The 
motivation for all groups, including government, private 
sector, labour, environmentalists and community activists 
to adopt this innovation in policy-making practices is the 
expectation that results emerging from the process will be 
more satisfactory than those arising from other approaches 
-- lobbying, political bargaining, boycotts, strikes or 
litigation -- and at the same preferable to the status quo. 
Experience from various efforts to mobilize such 
change suggests that it is essential for government not to 
commit just to acceptance of the results of the 
consultative process, but to being part of that process, 
represented at the negotiation table as a corporate entity, 
with its own interests, responsibility and expertise 
exposed along with those of all other parties. 
59 Fullan, p. 25 
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In shared decision-making there must be a clear 
understanding from the outset as to the roles 
and responsibilities of all parties, including 
government and non-government participants. 
This includes the recognition that the role of 
the participants is advisory to the lawful 
government decision-makers but that a consensus 
decision will be implemented to the greatest 
extent possible by government. This assumes 
that government is represented corporately as 
one of the parties to the negotiation and that 
it is forthrightly informing the other 
participants of policy and fiscal constraints. 
Where no consensus is reached the default 
procedure to the decision maker-must be 
clearly understood from the outset.60 
Where government is not involved in the evolution of 
what are usually very lengthy decision-making processes, it 
will not have bought into the process, will not have shared 
group learning and will not, therefore, have acquired an 
understanding of the reasoning behind decisions. It will 
have insufficient stake in the process, in consequence, to 
guarantee sustained implementation of the decisions 
emanating from negotiations.61 The result will be 
disillusionment with the process, by all parties. 
Government's commitment to the process will be 
severely tested as public participation grows. If it 
tolerates individual interest groups bypassing the process 
and returning to lobbying, it can expect other groups to 
follow suit. While consensus may not be always or 
completely reached in the consultation process, at the very 
least government will have access to information generated 
close to the implementation level, something from which 
policy formation can only benefit. 
60 Owen, p. 19-20. 
61 See George Penfold, Planning Act Reforms and Initiatives in 
Ontario: A Case Study in Integrated Policy Development, Paper presented 
to the IDRC Roundtable workshop on Integrating Social, Economic and 
Environmental Policy, Ottawa, May 8-89, 1995, and Armstrong, p. 32-33. 
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MANAGING INTEGRATIVE PROCESSES 
This brings us back to the conditions and kinds of 
leadership which prove effective in the management of 
implementation activities in situations of dynamic change. 
If leadership in these conditions should not impose 
strategies, what should it do? Mintzberg, Peters and 
Fullan agree that it should manage the process of strategy 
development, not the content. It should establish 
"umbrella strategies" which define the boundaries for 
experimentation, permit local experiments to generate 
operational strategies which may eventually be applied on 
a broader scale, and eventually shift the boundaries for 
experimentation.62 It should, in other words, creating an 
organizational environment which enables adaptation. 
Analysis of large-scale change efforts shows that 
leadership does count. Leadership's actions must be 
congruent with its espoused theory. Follow-through, and 
provision of resources to support creative experimentations 
with policy development and implementation are the 
necessary manifestation of management's commitment. 
In a large organization like Manitoba Hydro, 
general commitments made by senior management 
tend to have limited impact unless they are 
accompanied by tangible actions. Such actions 
confirm that the commitment is serious, 
providing leverage for groups in the 
organization such as environment staff, who are 
pushing for the introduction of measure that 
advance the commitment.' 
Management effectiveness has traditionally been 
defined as "optimizing within constraints". As Metcalfe 
points out, however, it might better be seen in the public 
sector, in a situation of dynamic complexity, as a 
"pluralistic process of interorganizational learning".64 
Redefining "effective" management in a situation of 
multistakeholder bargaining of interests, in terms of 
organizational learning, means that effectiveness may be 
62 Mintzberg, p. 213; Fullan, p. 38-39; Peters, 1992, p. 13. 
63 De Pape, p. 18 
64 Metcalfe, p. 187. 
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measured by the reconceptualization of where boundaries and 
standards should be, rather than in mechanical achievement 
of existing standards. It means that management takes 
responsibility for the overall performance of a system of 
policy negotiation, rather than for the success of 
individual activities. Failure is less of a risk for 
government if policy making is seen as a series of 
experiments, where occasional failures are an acceptable 
fact if they are accompanied by reflective learning. 
We know that both policy development and 
implementation involving integration of social, economic 
and environmental interests, are non-routine, complex, and 
unpredictable processes. We know that in these situations, 
flexibility is desirable: 
Rationalist prescriptions usually assume the 
feasibility of hierarchical control as the 
precondition of shouldering responsibility. 
Although management and control are often used 
as synonyms, there is a vital distinction 
between them: to manage is not to control 
....control in a strict sense presumes an 
ability to determine outcomes; control is 
possible if objectives are well-defined, well- 
ordered and stable, and the techniques needed 
to achieve them are proven and reliable. 
Predictability is the condition of control. 
Routine is the servant of control. It is when 
non-routine responses are needed that control 
breaks down and ...ingenuity, creativity, risk- 
taking, conflict-resolution; come into their 
own. 65 
In both British Columbia and Pakistan, small and 
separate organizations were created to shepherd the process 
of integration by line ministries and departments, and to 
bring into the decision-making process groups outside of 
government. Integrative enclaves have also been used 
within government ministries in Pakistan, for example; also 
in Manitoba Hydro, a large public utility in Canada which 
is attempting to integrate social, economic and 
environmental factors in its policy development. The 
massive inertia of large government organizations suggests 
65 Metcalfe, p. 178. 
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that it may be easier to mobilize change by creating new, 
small and flexible organizations, some independent of and 
others integrated in ministries, than by changing the basic 
structure of existing organizations. Changing the 
structure of an organization, as with any fundamental 
innovation, is more effectively done in catalytic and 
incremental stages.. A lot of time is wasted in 
restructuring, time better spent fostering attitudinal 
change. 
This approach is consistent with what we know about 
the diffusion, adoption and implementation of innovations. 
Incremental, adaptive and variable introduction of 
integrative principles is more likely to result in 
sustainable implementation, than is forced integration and 
restructuring. 
The role of government in the process in British 
Columbia was to provide a legislative framework 
legitimizing the negotiation process and guaranteeing 
enforcement of agreements reached at local or regional 
negotiating centres. This differs from the case in 
Pakistan, where integration started at the top of the 
policy process with national workshops, but were 
subsequently extended to state and local levels to obtain 
locally-relevant information and to guide implementation at 
state and local levels. What these two activities have in 
common, however, is that both are innovative, flexible and 
responsive organizations which manage complex processes of 
multiparty negotiation and integration, and both are in 
Peters' phrase and market terminology "pure knowledge 
plays." 
Learning theory suggests that incremental approaches 
to acquiring new behaviours provide the best option for 
sustained change because they provide people with margin 
for experimentation without immediately threatening core 
values. The Commission on Resources and Environment in 
British Columbia uses pilot projects to test the impact of 
suggestions made during multi-party negotiations. In 
Pakistan, during the process of developing integrated 
policies, 40 local pilot projects were undertaken to test 
and adapt policy. 
What we end up with, then, is a mixture of top-down 
and bottom-up participation in decision-making. This is 
consistent with what implementation theory suggests: that 
neither complete centralization nor decentralization works. 
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Like everything else in social change, a pragmatic, 
flexible and iterative approach is necessary. 
Centralization errs on the side of overcontrol, 
decentralization errs towards chaos .... the 
centre and local units need each other. You 
can't get anywhere by swinging from one 
dominance to another. What is required is a 
different two-way relationship of pressure, 
support and continuous negotiation. It amounts 
to top-down, bottom-up influence. Individuals 
and groups who cannot manage this paradox 
become whipsawed by the cross-cutting forces of 
change. 66 
If crisis provides the motivation for innovation, 
there will be no time, in any case, for neatly ordered 
procedures, as the former manager of the British Columbia 
negotiation processes points out: 
Notwithstanding the superficial attractiveness 
of logical, sequential, strategic planning 
commencing with the top-down development of 
principles and goals, followed by the 
development of a clear and comprehensive policy 
framework and detailed inventories and 
technical support mechanisms, to be combined 
then with broad-based and balanced public 
participation processes, this is not the way 
the political world works, nor is it likely the 
way that learning most effectively takes place. 
The CORE [Commission on Resources and 
Environment] experience with the development 
and implementation of integrated and 
sustainable, social, economic and environmental 
policy is that the urgency of the situation 
demands that everything proceed at once - 
principle and goal development, policy 
framework, information and technical support 
and public participation. While it can produce 
frustration, continuing conflict and threats to 
political resolve, it also allows each aspect 
to inform and learn from all others, resulting 
66 Fullan, p. 37-38. 
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in a more resilient, comprehensive and often 
unexpected result.67 
Tom Peters` analysis of private sector change suggests 
that slow, sequentially organized and painstakingly- 
researched decision-making is unlikely to be any more 
productive than the kind of gestalt process forced upon 
decision-makers by crisis. Strategic planning advocates 
"...examined strategic decisions in a vacuum, delaying 
grubby operational considerations until the "big choices" 
were made; as a result despite their painstakingly big- 
picture analyses, they were more likely to trip over 
details of implementation.1168 
Research on implementation, integration and innovation 
tells us, therefore, that perhaps the best approach to the 
creation of an organization which can facilitate 
integration, is a) to create a new office with its own 
mandate; supplemented by new organizational units in 
existing line agencies; b) to keep the new organization 
small; c) to keep management structures simple; and d) to 
encourage an organizational culture which values and 
rewards experimentation and which works within a framework 
of generally accepted principles to derive operating 
strategies from the experiences of implementation. 
Mintzberg calls such an organization, an "adhocracy".69 
Programme evaluations indicate that British Columbia's 
CORE meets these criteria. The question is, can the work 
of such an organization, of a "pure knowledge play", be 
sustained over time? Is there any prospect for 
institutionalization of the new decision-making processes? 
Interest groups are part of the institutional fabric 
of society. We accept that, within culturally-defined 
parameters, interest groups will fight for what they want. 
When an organization such as the Commission on Resources 
and Environment asks interest groups to realign themselves, 
to learn from each other, to form new coalitions of 
sectoral interests, and to participate in extra- 
67 Owen, p. 22. 
68 Peters, 1992, p. 42-43. 
69 Mintzberg, p. 196-220. 
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parliamentary negotiations of policy, it is working at the 
development of new institutions. When government is 
represented corporately at a negotiating table as one among 
many stakeholders in policy development, the rules of how 
we look at decision-making, and what we expect of 
government's role, change. 
There is no doubt that leadership of a change agency 
such as CORE, both from the elected officials and from the 
internal management of the agency, is important to any 
long-term sustainability of the process. But leadership 
changes. The premier who provided the mandate to 
legitimize CORE's activities has resigned. The first 
Commissioner, who built a strong and creative team 
committed to flexible implementation of its mandate, has 
moved on, as have many of the original staff. What remains 
to suggest that nascent political institutions, the 
patterns of negotiated policy which have begun over the 
past three years, will remain when a new government takes office? 
The Commission has a legislative mandate, with 
multiparty support. That mandate can be changed, and might 
be, if the land development decisions arrived at by the 
consultative process become issues in an election campaign. 
Will the attitudes supporting consultation and integration 
which have been developed in line agencies be maintained, 
or will there be a return to more sectoral, technocratic 
concerns? 
Institutionalization is under way. Six "shared 
decision-making processes" were conducted and 17 public 
reports produced under the new system between 1992 and 
1995. Acclaim for the work of the Commission has been 
strong, but far from universal, as large public 
demonstrations against reports of the Commission attest. 
People do have expectations today, however, about how to 
get what they want; expectations that they did not have 
three years ago. The Commission reports to the 
legislature but also, as it is mandated to do, directly to 
the people through the news media. This may also have 
created expectations about how government should work. 
In an effort to make this activity sustainable, to 
institutionalize it, CORE has proposed a "Sustainability 
Act". The Act would formalize procedures, confirm the 
status of negotiation as a continuing process for 
stakeholders and, most importantly, build in a role for 
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CORE not as the initiator of policy negotiation, but as the 
monitor of implementation and as the facilitator of 
implementation negotiations. It would also place the 
commitment of the province "in plain statutory view of a 
critically watchful international community. ,70 This is all 
consistent with what we know about how implementation is 
sustained. But it does not tell us, cannot tell us, 
whether the Act will be passed, and whether, if a new 
government is elected, a new administration will maintain 
the commitment to this new process. The bottom line, then, 
is that we do not know if this innovation will be 
sustained, if new institutions will grow out of the 
organizations which have functioned since 1992. 
CROSS-CULTURAL INTERVENTIONS 
Cultural differences affect how people approach the 
kind of group decision-making, interest negotiation or 
dispute resolution which make up a large part of 
integrative planning. These differences need not cross 
national boundaries. Differences of ethnic background, 
age, gender and socioeconomic status, among other factors, 
can affect how individuals or groups within a society 
perceive the validity of programming approaches. Among the 
most important differences in how cultures approach 
decision-making are those between collectivist (strong 
group identification) and individualist decision-making 
orientations. Attempts to redress imbalances of power 
between parties in negotiation may work well in one 
culture, but not in another. 
Similarly, where loss of face is a significant 
cultural concept, disputants may not wish to meet in 
person. Where role definition is diffuse, as in some Asian 
societies, an approach to negotiation which involves 
criticism of ideas may be seen as a criticism of the worth 
of the individual expressing them, and combined with "face" 
could prove dysfunctional to negotiation approaches which 
themselves are derived from the more specific role 
definitions found in Western societies. People coming from 
a diffuse-role society may reach formal agreements without 
ever buying into the negotiation process; motivation for 
70 Commission on Resources and Environment. A Sustainability Act 
for British Columbia. (Draft), September 16, 1994, p. 1. 
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adopting an agreement may be expedient rather than problem- 
solving, and the subsequent inability to sustain agreements 
may lead to a generalized lack of faith in the negotiation 
process.71 
Research on cultural factors affecting dispute 
resolution suggests, however, that like impediments to the 
diffusion and implementation of any other innovation, 
cultural factors need not mean abandonment of attempts to 
introduce multiparty negotiation. Readiness is an issue. 
Just as a crisis appears necessary to motivate large-scale 
integration activities in Canada, the perception of crisis 
may be necessary to overcome cultural reluctance to 
negotiate formally in places like Asia. Crises are 
occurring in even the most apparently consensus-oriented 
societies as they face spreading and violent confrontation 
over issues related to land use and the environment. 
Multiparty negotiation may only work in these societies 
when more private approaches to conflict resolution, 
(avoidance, forbearance, in-group mediation) cease to have 
utility. 
Multiparty negotiation for integrative policy making, 
like any other innovation, must be adapted to local 
conditions if it is to work and be sustained. Incremental 
experimentation allowing adaptation in different sites on 
different issues is likely to produce variations which 
build on local social practices for dispute resolution, 
produce results and can, therefore, be sustained. This 
will take time to work, will require of external 
intervenors patience and a tolerance for both ambiguity and 
variability in the process outcomes. The survival of 
parliamentary government as an institution in a variety of 
very different societies demonstrates that with suitable 
variation, cross-cultural transfer of institutions and 
concepts can take place. Case studies presented at a 
recent workshop on integration derived from experiences in 
Latin America, Africa, Asia and Canada indicate that 
71 See Michelle LeBaron Duryea, Conflict and Culture: A Literature 
Review and Bibliography, Victoria: Wic Institute for Dispute 
Resolution, 1993; and Michelle LeBaron Duryea and J. Bruce Grundison, 
Conflict and Culture: Research in Five Communities in Vancouver, 
British Columbia, Victoria: Wic Institute for Dispute Resolution, 
1993. 
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incremental development of integrated programmes is 
possible.72 They do not all look alike, but they do appear 
to work. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 
So, what role can international donor agencies play in 
promoting the creation of new organizations and 
institutions to facilitate integration of policy? A recent 
USAID study73 of factors facilitating implementation in aid 
programmes suggests that "champions", or what earlier 
researchers referred to in more nuanced terminology as 
"bureaucratic entrepreneurs",' should be identified by 
donors to mobilize the resources needed to sustain the 
implementation of innovation. Like all implementation, 
this strategy needs to be applied flexibly, however, with 
room for change. 
The role of technical experts in integrative 
programming is interesting. Economists, sociologists, 
environmental scientists all have technical information to 
bring to bear on the knotty problems of integrative 
programming. But field experience indicates that the 
critical issues driving the integration process will be 
motivation, ownership and adaptability. Technical experts 
will be most useful when they are called upon to provide 
data in answer to questions posed by others, and after 
political agreements have been reached that technical 
information is necessary. Research on one large Canadian 
utility attempting the integration of social, environmental 
and economic considerations in the formulation of its own 
programmes indicated that under pressure of time and 
events, the organization tended to trust its own personnel 
over outside technical experts. These were the people who 
understood the implementation issues in the actual 
72 Armstrong, 1995. 
73 United States Agency for International Development, 
Implementing Policy Change: Lessons Learned, Washington: USAID, 1992. 
74 
D. L. Dresang, Entrepreneurialism and Development 
Administration, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 18, #1, March 
1973 p. 76-83. 
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organizational context. Charged with managing the 
integration process, they wanted only that technical 
information which was specific to the subject at hand and 
pertained immediately to the organization or to the general 
industry; information which was current and succinct.75 In 
short, they trusted people they knew had experience 
relevant to the problem at hand, and with that experience, 
a working appreciation of the risks, difficulties and entry 
points for the introduction of change. 
Outside expertise can be provided to mobilize 
attention to a general issue. In Pakistan, for example, 
expertise was mobilized at the beginning of the integrative 
process to reveal an impending crisis. In general, 
experience suggests that if international technical 
assistance is provided, in addition to financial support, 
that it should, first, be expertise which can help guide 
general facilitative processes; second, should only be 
provided if local experts are not available; and third, 
when provided, should be overtly responsive to the 
political processes involved in negotiation. It is 
important that facilitators and technical experts 
themselves participate in those long and painful processes 
of learning which multiparty negotiations require. It is 
only through this process that they will learn what they do 
not know, and come to appreciate the relevance of local 
knowledge to the resolution of problems. Research 
unfortunately demonstrates that technical experts in any 
field are often among the most resistant to learning 
outside of their specialties,76 particularly where the 
process requires them to play a different, less 
authoritative, role. 
What we know from research on learning and on 
implementation is that the processes involved in bringing 
an innovation to life, and sustaining it in practice, are 
not easy. The implications for international assistance 
are clear. Patience, in addition to adaptability, is a 
75 De Pape, p. 27-30. 
76 Chris Argyris, Teaching Smart People How to Learn. In Robert 
Howard (Ed), The Learning Imperative, Cambridge: Harvard Business 
Review. ND. p. 177-184. Also Frank Fischer, Citizen participation and 
the democratization of policy expertise: From theoretical inquiry to 
practical cases, Policy Sciences, vol. 265. 1993 p. 165-187, and 
Armstrong, p. 24-26. 
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major prerequisite for sustaining effective implementation. 
Adaptation and experimentation both take time. There are 
no shortcuts to sustainability. Sponsors of integration 
have to be prepared to provide leadership, legitimation and 
resource support over the long term. International donors, 
similarly, have to be prepared for the long haul; what the 
USAID researchers refer to as "concerted attention over 
time". The USAID study confirms other implementation 
research as it is extended into cross-cultural contexts: 
that flexibility of timing and focus are necessary, that 
technical competence must be established during the process 
of intervention if participants are to have confidence. 
Warwick's study of aid interventions for population 
programmes found that sustained commitment of leadership, 
mobilization of local support roups and continuity of 
programme inputs were important." 
If failures are to be seen as learning opportunities, 
then the evaluations applied to these complicated processes 
by domestic and international sponsors must recognize this 
in the way they are structured. This is an easy concept to 
espouse, but, like everything else, apparently a difficult 
one to put into use. Practitioners of integrated policy 
development express clear frustration with evaluations 
which focus only on controversy and case-by-case setbacks. 
What they want from governments and international aid 
donors are evaluations which focus on whether and how they 
are learning from problems; how, over time, decision-making 
processes adapt and perform; and how they compare to status 
quo alternatives.78 
If change in the organizational cultures of groups 
participating in integrated policy development is necessary 
as part of the learning process, then the culture of aid 
organizations will also have to change, to accept the 
evolutionary nature of integrative policy negotiation. Just as government must be an active participant in that 
process, so too must aid agencies participate actively in 
77 Warwick, p. 185. 
78 Armstrong, p. 28 - 30. See also Robert A Kelly and Donald K. 
Alper, Transforming British Columbia's War in the Woods: An Assessment 
of the Vancouver Island Regional Negotiation Process of the Commission 
on Resources and Environment, Victoria: UVic Institute for Dispute 
Resolution 1995, p. 10-12. 
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the discussion of programme design. Experimentation is 
risky. A transparent commitment to the process is 
necessary if all participants are to make the substantial 
commitments necessary to make integration work. The other 
participants need to know how much, what kind and over what 
period margin for experimentation will be provided by 
donors. It is only then they will be willing to take the 
risks involved in overturning the established procedures of 
hierarchical policy development. 
CONCLUSION: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Following are some critical research issues implied by the 
previous discussion which need to be addressed if cross- 
cultural attempts to proceed with integrated policy 
development and implementation are to proceed: 
1. What is the role of democratic political institutions in 
supporting the development of integrated policy? 
a) Is it possible to proceed effectively with the 
development of integrated policy in the absence of 
formal democratic electoral processes? 
b) Does public participation in planning processes 
undermine legislative authority or legislative 
democracy? 
c) What is the effect of shared decision-making on 
those who do not participate? 
Are democratic political institutions a 
prerequisite for the implementation of integrative 
programmes? Not necessarily. It remains to be seen 
whether democratic systems have the patience to 
sustain experiments which incorporate failure. 
Certainly democratic institutions will encourage 
participation, but they may at the same time undermine 
continuity. 
It is likely that a range of factors are involved 
in determining how feasible it will be to establish a 
participatory, integrative process, and how likely it 
is that the process will be sustained long enough to 
become institutionalized. Levels of conflict in the 
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society, attitudes towards bringing conflict into the 
open, the existence of formal democratic processes, 
expertise and financial resources available to support 
the process, and the culture of government 
institutions, in addition to the general culture of 
the society, will all play a role. It is quite 
possible that societies without democratic political 
institutions, once motivated by crisis to undertake 
participatory integrative policy development, will 
find less problem in sustaining the innovation over a 
long period, than will democratic governments which 
face electoral challenges. 
2. What cultural factors will affect formulation and 
implementation of integrated policies? 
a) In any society in which integrated programming is 
being undertaken, what are the values likely to 
support or undermine attempts to integrate planning 
among groups with opposing interests? 
b) What indigenous institutions and organizations 
affect the way in which conflict and negotiation of 
interests are handled? 
c) What indicators exist to tell intervenors how much 
flexibility there is in values and institutions? 
d) Will existing institutions and organizations 
provide a framework for adaptation of approaches to 
integrated programming? What will make these 
approaches acceptable and effective? 
e) "Is the commonly used mediation model [for dispute 
resolution] flexible enough to accommodate the values 
of diverse peoples... ? "I 
f) What are the cultural limitations of third-party neutrality in negotiation? 
g) What obstacles exist to the incorporation of 
minority-group values in integration processes? 
79 Duryea, 1992, p. 1 
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Most institutions are susceptible to 
evolutionary, and at times revolutionary, change. It 
is important to go beneath superficial understandings 
of culture or the "espoused theory" of how cultures 
and institutions function, to learn what the "theory 
in use" is. It is important to know how indigenous 
organizations and institutions affect decision-making, 
how they can be replicated or built upon to function 
in new problem areas, before foreign institutions are 
imported. 
Minority group values and strategies for 
integration and negotiation are relevant to all 
cultures. It is likely that ethnic, religious, or 
linguistic minority groups will be implicated in or 
affected by any negotiations over integrated policy 
development. Certainly this is true in many disputes 
over agricultural techniques, resource-extraction, 
irrigation and industrial pollution. The problem for 
those who are interested in cross-cultural application 
of integrated programming approaches is not just 
finding a model of dispute resolution or interest 
negotiation which differs from North American models 
and accommodates national differences, but finding 
models which, within any given society, can be 
modified to accommodate the needs of indigenous groups 
and national minorities. 
3. What accountability systems can be established to 
functionally assess integrated programming, particularly 
those approaches to integration which are process, and not 
outcome, based? 
4. What models of interorganizational networking are 
appropriate as integrative policy development tools, in the 
context of different bureaucratic cultures? 
5. What are the most effective forms of assistance which 
external donors can provide in the creation of "margin" for 
experimentation with integrated programming? 
6. What is the most effective method of integrating 
technical expertise in multiparty negotiations, and of 
educating experts themselves to play a responsive, rather 
than a directive role? 
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